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Edwin T. Meredith 619
the company and chairman of the board until 1%8. when Darwin
Tucker succeeded him as president. A superb salesman, like his
predecessor and mentor. Bohen did not attempt to change the ra-
tionale of Better Homes and Gardens from its home service orien-
tation. Instead, he wisely supported it and by 1970 the magazine's
circulation neared eight million.
Until 1946 the Meredith family owned the Meredith enter-
prises. As Meredith Corporation, it is publicly owned and com-
posed of six major divisions, one of which continues to publish
Better Homes and Gardens and Successful Farming and dozens
of Special Interest Publications developed from the magazines, as
well as numerous home project plans that are sold through the
magazines.
Book Reviews
The Hoover Presidency: A Reappraisal. Edited by Martin L. Fau-
sold and George T. Mazuzan. Albany: State University of New
York Press. 1974, 224 pp.
During the past decade Herbert Clark Hoover has received in-
creasing attention from historians. One result of this new atten-
tion has been the reassessment of Hoover from fresh perspectives
rather than within his usual role as a foil for Franklin D. Roose-
velt. The Hoover Presidency: A Reappraisal, a collection of essays
originally presented to a conference on Hoover at the State Uni-
versity College at Geneseo. New York, is a welcome addition to
the recent scholarship.
In an essay on the election of 1928. Donald R. McCoy finds
that Hoover fashioned an astute campaign strategy which empha-
sized Republican accomplishments during the 1920s and pro-
jected Hoover as the candidate best equipped to manage the pros-
perity everyone was confident would confinue. McCoy's conten-
tion that Hoover won the election because he was "a man for the
times" is a healthy counterbalance to the usual interpretation
that Democratic candidate Alfred E. Smith lost the election be-
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cause of his own political liabilities and divisions in his party ^  Less
convincing is the unsupported claim that issues other than who
should manage the country's prosperity "only swelled Hoover's
and Smith's votes in roughly equal proportion." A second piece on
the pre-crash period by David B. Burner outlines Hoover's activ-
ities in the first eight months of his presidency. Employing the fa-
miliar framework of Hoover's attempt to blend expertise and vol-
untarism. Burner evaluates the new president's accomplishments
in such areas as civil liberties, conservation, penal reform, health,
education, housing, Indian management, waterways improve-
ment, and foreign policy. Burner sees Hoover's efforts in these
areas as an outgrowth of his activities as secretary of commerce
and attributes his failure fully to implement these programs to the
onset of the Depression.
The three essays on Hoover's efforts to cope with the Depres-
sion are unquestionably the most original and useful of the
volume. After reviewing conservative, liberal, and revisionist in-
terpretations of Hoover's economic programs, Alfred U. Romasco
erriploys an alternative approach in comparing his countercyclical
policies with those of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow
Wilson, and Warren G. Harding, and finds wanting the consen-
sus that "no president, prior to Hoover, accepted federal respon-
sibility for assuring the economic wellbeing of the nation. . . ."
Hoover had ample precedence to call upon, Romasco claims, but
he added refinements and innovations and was "a significant fig-
ure in the evolution of governmental policies for dealing with De-
pressions." Jordan H. Schwarz explains Hoover's hostility toward
Congress as a product of his fear that congressional factionalism
arising from special interest infiuence threatened his efforts to
bring about economic recovery. Instead of cooperating with the
legislative branch in seeking economic solutions, he chose to work
through a network of voluntary organizations and local and state
governments, which he believed were less susceptible to broker
politics. Schwarz also includes an excellent vignette of Hoover's
personality. Ellis W. Hawley's superb essay evaluates the applica-
tion of Hoover's twin concepts of "corporatism" and "cooperative
competition," as the president sought to restore economic order
and efficiency while preserving the benefits of individualism and a
self-adjusting market mechanism. His failure to bring about re-
covery led to the discrediting of his model for economic policy.
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Still, Hawley concludes, "the Hoover years appear as a distinctive
yet integral stage in the continuing process whereby twentieth-
century policy-makers have tried to reconcile confiicting visions of
a new order with the dreams that they inherited from nineteenth-
century liberalism and agrarianism."
Alfred B. Rollins and Frank Freidel assess the relationship
between Hoover and Roosevelt. With admirable candor, Rollins
observes that Roosevelt's negative view of his presidential prede-
cessor, which emerged during the 1920s and matured as the eco-
nomic crisis of the thirties deepened, became a presumption for
Rollins' generation of New Deal historians, who have been prin-
cipally responsible for Hoover's poor historical image. He is de-
lighted with the new scholars who are "beginning to break
through the New Deal mold" and concludes that since "we no
longer feel compelled to destroy or defend Herbert Hoover, we
may even begin to approach him as part of a complex society,
rather than as the simplistic symbol for an [sic] whole era of his-
tory." Perhaps more than any ofthe other contributors, Freidel
finds it difficult to break with habit. Traversing the well worn
path of Hoover's unsuccessful efforts during the interregnum to
secure a commitment from Roosevelt to maintain the gold stan-
dard, he feels compelled to assess blame for the failure ofthe two
men to cooperate in meeting the problems ofthe Depression. He
assigns blame to both but, almost apologetically, apportions
more to Hoover.
The remaining two essays deal with Hoover's foreign policy.
Selig Adler's short historiographical review praises the work of
the moderate revisionists but is critical of the New Leftists' at-
tempt to rehabilitate Hoover. Seeking explanation for Hoover's
attraction for the New Leftists, Adler offers the reasonable sug-
gestion that it may be found in their "nostalgic longing for the
kind of limited internationalism that Hoover always advocated"
and then rather gratuitiously speculates that these anti-Roosevelt
iconoclasts will seek to refurbish Hoover's image "in order to cut
his successor down to size," Joan Hoff Wilson traces the evolution
of Hoover's "independent internationalism," the basic tenet of
which was cooperation in world affairs without binding commit-
ments, from the early 1920s through his presidency.
Martin L. Fausold and George T. Mazuzan, the organizers of
the Hoover conference and editors of the volume, deserve com-
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mendation for bringing together such a distinguished group of
historians. It is, however, difficult to understand why there is no
New Left representative among them. Several of the contributors,
to be sure, summarize and evaluate the work of the New Leftists.
But in view of their recognized importance in the new Hoover
scholarship, it would perhaps have been appropriate to allow at
least some of them to speak for themselves. Furthermore, the edi-
tors might have provided a more cogent overview of the essays.
They tell us that the conference included an "invigorating dialo-
gue" which "cemented the papers into a composite and reap-
praised view of the Hoover presidency." Unfortunately, their text-
book-like introduction evidences little of this synthesis.
Donald L. Winters
Vanderbilt university
Carl Becker: On History and the Climate of Opinion, by Char-
lotte Watkins Smith. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press. 1973, 225 pp.
Both Iowans and historians should appreciate this paperback
edition of a 1956 study about a native Iowan and distinguished
historian. Since the book focuses primarily on Carl Becker as a
historical philosopher and literary craftsman, only approximately
one fourth of its contents is formal biography. However, in the
extended analysis of Becker's views of history as an intellectual
endeavor, and as an art, references are made to events or phases
in his early life which left deep marks on him. Unfortunately, his
lack of pretense and generally unimpressive appearance are sim-
plistically attributed to his background, although there is reason
to believe that Becker went through a stage of rejecting his heri-
tage.
Any reader familiar with Hamlin Garland will probably see
some parallels of the two youths whose fertile minds simmered
restlessly in enviornments which provided limited stimulation. At
age eleven Becker, whose family had moved to Waterloo, discov-
ered the public library and read his way through its holdings with
a growing awareness of the variety and diverse quality of litera-
ture. That led to the resolution to become a writer. After a brief
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stint at Cornell College, he transferred to the University of Wis-
consin where exposure to the eminent historian Frederick Jackson
Turner destined Becker to study and write history.
The work chiefly stresses Becker's development as a historian
and establishes that his chief contribution to the field was as a
pioneer relativist who helped free history from the stagnation of
"scientific history." Beyond his effort to liberate history, Becker
devoted himself to writing history which conveyed the mood of a
period, probed the motivation of historical figures and searched
for some comprehension of psychological factors in historical
events.
Few would dispute that Becker left permanent impressions on
his chosen field, but the type of analysis contained in this work
does not lend itself to the graceful prose he produced, and the ex-
cessively close tracing of Becker's writing technique by examin-
ing several drafts of a particular paragraph in one of his books is
probably something he would have found repugnant. (Those in-
terested in Becker's own work will find an extensive list in Smith's
bibliography.) Yet professionals and others will be stimulated by
Becker's search for the meaning and essence of history as a pro-
cess of recalling and using the past.
Walter Houf
Drake University
Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Interven-
tion in World War II, by Wayne S. Cole. New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich. 1974, pp. 298. $10.00
The late Charles A. Lindbergh vigorously attempted to divert
the United States away from entry into World War II and became
a leading spokesman of the America First Committee. But Lind-
bergh, a loyal American, who as a civilian later flew fifty combat
missions against the Japanese, lost the respect of most Amer-
icans, who retaliated emotionally instead of answering his numer-
ous penetrating questions.
Wayne S. Cole, Iowa born and reared, a B.A. graduate of the
University of Northern Iowa, for several years a history professor
at Iowa State University, and now at the University of Maryland,
is perhaps the best qualified historian in the country to present
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this unbiased, scholarly, and quite readable account of Lind-
bergh's role in foreign policy before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Cole's America First (1953) and Senator Gerald P. Nye and
American Foreign Relations (1962) both deal with various aspects
of isolationism in the nation before December, 1941.
Charles A. Lindbergh . . . begins with the focus on Lind-
bergh's appearance at the Hollywood Bowl on June 20, 1941, one
of several America First rallies, then succinctly describes the war
picture of desperation for the Allies at the time. Cole next takes
the reader back to the early life of the famous aviator in Minne-
sota and the influence of his lawyer father who served in the U.S.
House as a Progresssive Republican. Charles A., Sr. was an
agrarian radical, an insurgent, who attacked the money interests,
opposed U.S. entry into World War I when this struggle began,
but lost election to the Senate in 1916. The son later claimed his
father had no direct influence on his own foreign-affairs views
about World War II, but the similarities are, nevertheless, strik-
ing. Lindbergh restricted his efforts to opposing U.S. entry into the
second war; he never embraced the agrarian radicalism of Sena-
tors William E. Borah, Burton K. Wheeler, or Gerald P. Nye.
Only fifteen-sixteen during World War I, young Lindbergh
helped on the family farm, dabbled in the study of mechanical
engineering at the University of Wisconsin, then turned to a per-
manent interest in aviation by 1922, the year of his initial plane
ride. He was a military pilot, parachute jumper and wing walker,
then mail pilot, but his non-stop solo fiight across the Atlantic
Ocean in 1927 catapulted him into prominence. Lindbergh mar-
ried Anne Morrow in 1929; the couple flew together throughout
the world, mapped aviation routes, and later wrote stimulating
accounts of their feats. They longed for privacy, which never
came, and the crowning blow was the kidnapping and murder of
their son in 1932.
The Lindberghs lived from 1935 to early 1939 in England and
France; from these vantage points Lindbergh could visualize the
panorama of political chaos emerging. The British were lethargic
and refused to heed his warnings about German ascendancy in
aviation. The French, whom he loved, realized their inferior
status but frankly acknowledged the inability to correct their poli-
tical system enough to reverse the trend. The Lindberghs made
several visits to the Soviet Union.
Book Reviews 625
The U.S. Air Attache in Berlin, Major Truman Smith, invited
Lindbergh to assess the German position in aviation. Immedi-
ately Lindbergh became convinced that Germany was the natural
air power of Europe and not very far behind the United States. He
never embraced National Socialism, never met Hitler, and disap-
proved of much that he saw in Germany. His third German trip,
in 1938, caused havoc. U.S. Ambassador Hugh R. Wilson invited
Lindbergh to a stag dinner, at which time, without previous
notice to Wilson and Lindbergh, Hermann Goering presented
Lindbergh with a German civilian medal, primarily for his earlier
aviation contributions. Cole correctly asserts that Lindbergh had
no choice but to accept the decoration for the U.S. and Germany
were not at war. Moreover, he was the guest of the American Am-
bassador, who readily condoned the proceedings. Within a month
the Nazis stepped up their horrendous Jew-baiting, and the on-
slaught against Lindbergh ensued. Secretary of the Interior Har-
old L. Ickes led the charge and relentlessly toyed with Lind-
bergh's reputation. Lindbergh insisted that he had no desire for
popularity based on the press. Nevertheless, Ickes continued his
tirades against the "Knight of the German Eagle" and finally got
under his skin. In July, 1941, Lindbergh reminded President
Franklin D. Roosevelt in an open letter that he had been the guest
of the U.S. Ambassador at the time the medal was conferred. He
now deserved an apology from Ickes. The President ignored the
letter.
Meanwhile, Lindbergh warned the British, French, and his fel-
low Americans that the German air force was now better than the
combined units of these three future allies. Lindbergh urged
French leaders to purchase 300 airplane engines the Germans
were willing to sell them and to build aircraft factories in southern
Canada. The French delayed too long. The infamous Munich
Conference transpired followed by Hitler taking the rest of
Czechoslovakia. The Lindberghs returned to live in the United
States. Lindbergh had worked with other U.S. diplomats and mili-
tary experts throughout these years in assessing the European
scene. General H. H. Arnold, chief of the Army Air Corps,
praised Lindbergh's personal report to him in April, 1939, as the
best he had seen to date. Arnold persuaded Lindbergh to return
to active duty though the famous aviator did this only for two
weeks, after which he served anyway without salary.
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Lindbergh shunned the entreaties of former diplomats and
the conservative broadcaster Fulton Lewis, Jr., about entering
politics. In mid-September, two weeks after the war started,
Lindbergh went on radio to express his stand against American
entanglement in the struggle. Former President Herbert Hoover,
and Senator Borah applauded him. The Roosevelt Administra-
tion attempted, through his friend Truman Smith, to halt Lind-
bergh's approach by offering him a new position in FDR's Cabi-
net as Secretary of Air. The isolationist refused.
Cole presents valuable evidence of the contrasts between
Roosevelt and Lindbergh and the ways in which the Administra-
tion frustrated the noninterventionists without FDR publicly en-
tering the fracas. "Warily they stalked each other." (p. 127).
FDR was not pro-Communist; Lindbergh not pro-Nazis. Roosevelt
overfeared Germany, while Lindbergh believed the Soviet Union
to be the greater menace. Lindbergh favored negotiations, but
FDR believed no lasting peace could be gained from Germany.
The President advocated aid-short-of war; Lindbergh called this
defeating in the end to Western civilization as the war would be
prolonged. Roosevelt wanted and later got unconditional sur-
render of Germany; Lindbergh believed before Pearl Harbor this
action would only open the West to the Asians. Privately FDR
wooed interventionist support, e.g.. Editor William Allen White,
who founded the American Committee to Defend America by
Aiding the Allies. The President told Secretary of the Treasury
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., "I am absolutely convinced that Lind-
bergh is a Nazi." (pp. 128-129). FDR authorized the use of bug-
ging devices in May of 1941. FDR requested a report on our Civil
War Copperheads and saw to it that the famous aviator was
labelled a Copperhead. Lindbergh resigned from the Army Air
Corps but regretted the fact that so many pacifists rallied around
him. He was not one of them.
The tone of the Great Debate had much in common with the
debacle over McCarthyism a decade or more later. Each featured
lavish use of guilt-by-association. Lindbergh stubbornly resisted
the pleas of his friends to modify his stance. Disgusted with the
fetish to damn the enemy when we were not at war, he doggedly
claimed Britain had lost the war, would not publicly condemn
German cruelties, and incurred the wrath of accusers calling him
a revolutionary when he asked for new American leadership. On
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September 11, 1941, at Des Moines, he accused the British, the
Jewish, and the Roosevelt Administration as the chief war agita-
tors. He considered the British the worst offenders, but his men-
tion of the Jews brought him the worst reaction. Cole asserts cor-
rectly that this reference was a very serious blunder, even though
Lindbergh was definitely not anti-Semitic. Even many Jews
agreed that his comments were not to be construed as anti-Jewish.
Christians joined the attack on Lindbergh. Socialist Norman
Thomas quit America First over the incident. Actually the Des
Moines speech also hurt Lindbergh by diverting attention from
FDR's interventionist antics,
Lindbergh now turned vehemently against Roosevelt, charging
there existed government by subterfuge, using the same type of
arguments that liberals would direct against President Richard
M. Nixon some thirty years later. In a speech prepared for De-
cember 12 but never delivered because of Pearl Harbor, Lind-
bergh hoped that our democracy and freedom might be applied to
the blacks in the South rather than involving our future in Europe
and Asia, Chester Bowles and Senator Wheeler, among others,
saw brilliant political potential in the fiier and surmised he could
lead a third party after the war. He was not interested.
The events at Pearl Harbor shocked him, and immediately he
announced his support of the U.S. war effort. But he learned that
Roosevelt was unforgiving and found the way blocked to regaining
his military positions. Moreover, at first the White House stymied
his efforts to work for other government bodies as well as Pan
American Airways, United Aircraft, and Curtiss-Wright, In
March of 1942, old Henry Ford, never awed by FDR, employed
Lindbergh, who served for the duration without salary, testing and
improving such advanced weapons as the P-47, the P-38, and
the Corsair bomber here and in the Pacific for Ford and also later
United Aircraft. Several other America Firsters never regained
their commissions but also served as civilians.
Lindbergh deplored the warfare and the bombing-strafing of
targets with unknown occupants, the atrocities committed on
both sides. He voiced particular shock at the American atrocities
against the Japanese, On a later technical visit to Germany and
Austria for United Aircraft (May of 1945), he similarly was sick-
ened by German torture chambers—he saw one—but also by
American misdeeds in Europe.
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Selig Adler, among other historians, has offered the fairest ac-
count of Lindbergh's mistaken judgement. The Cole book, based
on primary sources, gives a penetrating analysis of the Great De-
bate and closes with a series of most appropriate questions which
the author believes should be answered before accurate judgment
on Lindberg might be rendered. Cole wonders what might have
happened if the British, French, and Americans has reacted dif-
ferently toward Germany at various times after World War I, if
these allies had established better defense postures in the 30s, if
Britain and France would have allowed Hitler to take more terri-
tory in the East but negotiated for the West, if the U.S. had not
aided Britain short-of-war, and just how much the Great Debate
undermined the country. The author is correct in saying that we
must question beyond passion and prejudice to evaluate Lind-
bergh, who was not always right. Perhaps Cole expects too much
of Americans who cannot in 1975 reach beyond prejudice and
passion in debating the Middle East question among other dis-
putes.
Donald R. Whitnah
University of Northern Iowa
Building an American Pedigree, by Norman E. Wright. Provo,
Utah: Brigham Young University Press. 1974 pp. xvi, 639.
$7.95.
Building an American Pedigree purports to be an all purpose
reference book and "how-to" guide for genealogists. It is, in this
reviewer's opinion, a 640-page advertisement for the Latter Day
Saints Genealogical Society in Salt Lake City. It reads like a
heavily-padded senior thesis, and suffers greatly from sheer
wordiness. A volume of about 200 pages—minus the excess
verbiage—would have emphasized the useful information. The
book is profusely illustrated, but most of the illustrations are
superfiuous, except perhaps the migration maps. The majority
should have been eliminated since they serve no useful purpose.
Wright sometimes uses both first-person and third-person
within the same paragraph, which is distracting (e.g. page 544,
second paragraph). Also organization of the material is incon-
sistent; for example: on page 226, the reader isn't told whether
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the heading "Naturalization Records" refers to those records in
general, or merely the records in the District of Columbia—the
subhead on the preceding page. Five pages list American genea-
logical periodicals, but no addresses are included, making the
list rather useless. Futhermore, there is no index, so the table of
contents must be studied closely to determine where to look for a
particular subject of interest.
This large volume might be intimidating to the beginning
genealogist. Reference works, like business letters, should be
both concise and precise. Building an American Pedigree adds
little to a genealogical bookshelf, except perhaps a three-pound
bookend. And it doesn't even do that task well.
Steven Coulter
Meredith Publishing Services
Western Iowa Prehistory, by Duane Anderson. Ames: Iowa
State University Press. 1975. pp. 100, $3.95. Illustrated by
Lennis Moore.
This attractive book presents an account ofthe ancient peo-
ples who inhabited western Iowa. The simple, direct language
and detailed pictures make it useful to school age children as
well as adults interested in learning about prehistoric cultures.
Weapons, potsherds, and bones found at the archaeological dig-
gings carried out in western Iowa, particularly since the early
1950s, provide important clues to an understanding of the devel-
oping patterns of life, religious concepts, and emerging economic
systems, from the earliest nomadic groups to the later settled vil-
lage farmers. The discussion ofthe Woodland peoples ("mound
builders"), and the Great Oasis, Glenwood, Mill Creek, and
Oneota cultures is a valuable summary of early man in Iowa.
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